Congress should authorize the air campaign but prohibit ground invasion and indefinite war. This prevents quagmire while allowing achievable goals: degrading nuclear and missile programs. Such a resolution reasserts congressional war powers, limits escalation, and provides a framework for ending hostilities.
Earlier this month, Democrats in the House and Senate proposed resolutions that sought to reassert Congress into the warmaking process and limit President Donald Trump’s ability to continue the air campaign against Iran. Democrats were right to insist that, in a constitutional democracy, any big new decision on a major military operation should be debated and approved first by the people’s branch of government. Doing so would not have foreclosed the possibility of tactical surprise or innovative warfighting concepts; it would simply have authorized the use of certain types of force by the United States in its confrontation with the Islamic Republic.
But the Democrats’ resolutions were inadequate. They were effectively a punt—a call for Trump to pause the campaign until Congress has time for a fuller debate and a vote on a proper resolution. They did not hint at what that future resolution might seek to achieve. The Iran nuclear issue has been around for more than two decades, and the Islamic Republic has posed a broader challenge for 47 years. Democratic demands for a break in the bombing of Iran so that Congress can have a belated policy debate are not an optimal use of the power of the legislature; instead, they effectively amount to holding a referendum on Trump. More important, at this juncture, the resolutions leave the United States directionless, still fully reliant on Trump alone to make all the key decisions on the future course of the war. Republican Senator Lisa Murkowski’s recent proposed resolution is somewhat better but only calls for consultation and reporting to Congress—it does not seek to impose sorely needed parameters around future U.S. military intervention against Iran.
A better approach would be to approve, retroactively, Trump’s air campaign to date, including its attacks on Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, but prohibit a large-scale escalation that might involve ground combat forces and oppose an air campaign of indefinite duration with the implausible goal of sparking regime change from the air. To be sure, any such proposed resolution would only be a starting point for congressional debate, to be held in full view of the American public, as is appropriate when a democracy considers the most profound national questions of war and peace. But it would be a starting point with purpose, grounded in sound policy analysis, rather than just a vague expression of unhappiness with the current course of events.
SETTING THE PARAMETERS
Many Americans might have preferred that this war never start at all. But now that it has, there is no undoing it. Moreover, every U.S. president since George W. Bush has arrogated to himself the right to determine if and when to strike Iran to prevent it from getting a nuclear weapon, offering no assurances that Congress would have a say in the decision. Trump’s choice to go to war with Iran may or may not be optimal, but his sidelining of Congress in the process is neither radical nor entirely unexpected. The resolution should accept this basic reality.
Yet as has become painfully clear in recent days, the war’s end is quite possibly a long way off. Trump oscillates between a preference to stop hostilities soon and a preference to change the Iranian regime by inducing a popular uprising; Israel leans even more strongly toward the latter objective, however unpromising it may be. Some of the war’s goals, such as seriously setting back Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and seriously damaging its navy, seem well on the way to completion. But more ambitious aims—a definitive resolution of the nuclear question, a reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, and the collapse of the Iranian government—remain elusive.
To realize those objectives, Trump may be tempted to launch a ground invasion—and his stated aim of regime change makes the scenario quite plausible, as does the movement into the region of many thousands of additional U.S. soldiers. The United States has only achieved regime change by putting troops on the ground (such as in Panama in 1989 and Iraq in 2003), by working with a strong indigenous armed ally (such as the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan in 2001), or by decimating an enemy society for years through comprehensive airpower and maritime power (such as against Japan in World War II). None of these conditions exist in Iran today.
Ruling out a ground invasion by congressional resolution would not deprive Trump of several options for limited ground operations that have been floated in recent days and weeks. Specifically, a prohibition on an invasion force would not preclude a large raid on Iran’s nuclear facilities by U.S. Special Forces. Nor would it eliminate the possibility of seizing Kharg Island, the hub of Iran’s oil export business, or of establishing a ground presence along the coastline of Iran near the Strait of Hormuz. It is not clear that any of these options are advisable at present, but it is not Congress’s job to develop a detailed strategy or to mimic the president’s role as commander in chief. Its job, rather, is to set broad parameters for the conflict.
TOWARD AN ENDGAME
Since a major ground conflict against Iran would almost certainly constitute a war under Article 1 of the U.S. Constitution, Congress would be within its rights to adjudicate on the matter. Indeed, even the current operation should be viewed as a war, given the ambitious nature of its aims, necessitating congressional authorization. Whether or not the administration calls the campaign a war, Trump can disregard Congress for only so long when using military force abroad. The 1973 War Powers Resolution gives the U.S. president a 60-to-90-day window to conduct major military operations without congressional approval. The current operation is already nearly halfway to that point.
A congressional resolution of the type proposed here would have several substantive advantages. It would prevent a possible major escalation without compromising the pursuit of attainable and desirable goals, while holding Trump to his earlier promises to avoid military quagmires. (Iran is a country of nearly 100 million people, three times the population of Iraq or Afghanistan.) It would also reduce the risk of eroding the United States’ military readiness for other potential conflicts and weakening deterrence in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.
Beyond that, the resolution could improve the odds of winding down the war within weeks, preventing a prolonged global energy crisis. Such a course of action would have the broad backing of the American public and likely elicit considerable Republican support in Congress. Finally, it would reassert Congress back into the business of participating in decisions on grave national matters of war and peace while still permitting Trump to claim success in this military operation as measured against certain stated goals, notably the serious weakening of Iran’s nuclear and missile forces.
If Congress so desired, it could attach this resolution to the supplemental budget resolution that the Pentagon will likely send to Capitol Hill within days. According to press accounts, that request might total $200 billion, for a war that has probably cost around $30 billion already. Rather than approve the full $200 billion (which would implicitly bless a prolongation or escalation of the conflict), Congress could approve $60 billion to $75 billion. That would be enough to continue operations at roughly the current scale through April and into May. Trump would then have to come back with a request—and a justification—for another resolution and additional funding, if necessary, should the war continue past that point.
It is regrettable that Trump undertook a major military operation without first consulting Congress. But he has plenty of company in this regard and, moreover, there is no turning back the clock. Democrats and other critics of Trump should develop a forward-looking policy alternative rather than simply relitigating decisions that have already been made.