By Yaakov Lappin
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The Red Sea crisis predates the Swords of Iron War, but became a specifically Israeli security threat after October 2023, with the start of a Houthi military-terrorist solidarity campaign with Hamas. The Houthis launched a blockade on Israeli-linked shipping, but also harmed Red Sea maritime traffic in general with attacks on ships, causing a 50% reduction in Suez Canal traffic within a few months and forcing the Israeli Port of Eilat to suffer serious losses. The cessation of Houthi attacks on US vessels in May 2025, following a ceasefire agreement with Washington, did not signal an end to the conflict but rather a shifting of the crosshairs to focus more on trying to blockade Israel from the south. Since the October 2025 Israel-Hamas ceasefire, the Houthis have held their fire against Israel. Reports suggest that the UAE, possibly with the quiet blessing of Saudi Arabia, and anti-Houthi forces within Yemen are building new strategic positions to deal with the ongoing radical Shiite threat from Saana.
In the years prior to the Israel-Hamas war that began on October 7, 2023, the Iranian-backed Houthi movement (Ansar Alalh) terrorized Saudi cities, airports, and oil sites, as well as striking targets in the United Arab Emirates (including Abu Dhabi fuel tanks in January 2022). The Houthi attacks prompted a Saudi-led coalition to launch an air campaign against the group, which lasted until a 2021 US arms embargo on Riyadh forced the Saudis to halt their offensive.
Of all the adversaries with whom the Houthis picked fights, the Israelis caused them the most damage. The Israeli Air Force’s Operation Lucky Drop in August 2025 appeared to inflict severe harm on the Houthis’ senior military and civilian regime command.
But tensions with Saudi Arabia and the UAE are not over. In a scarcely reported sign of continued hostilities, Saudi forces reportedly shelled Houthi positions in northwest Yemen on multiple occasions in September and November 2025 in response to threats from Yemen.
On October 20, the Associated Press reported that satellite imagery confirmed the construction of a strategic airstrip on Zuqar Island. This island is located 90 kilometers (55 miles) southeast of the Houthi-controlled port hub of Hodeida, which has been struck repeatedly by the Israeli Air Force.
“The airstrip on Zuqar Island provides yet another link in a network of offshore bases in a region key to international shipping, where the Houthis already have attacked over 100 ships, sank [sic] four vessels and killed at least nine mariners during the Israel-Hamas war,” the AP report stated. It noted the following features on the island:
Runway: A 2,000-meter airstrip that is theoretically capable of hosting tactical transport aircraft (C-130 Hercules), surveillance drones, and light attack aircraft
Logistics: A 185-meter jetty (a structure built from the shore into the water) and logistics warehouses, which suggest an intention to establish a permanent garrison rather than a temporary expeditionary outpost
Timeline: A dock on which construction commenced in April 2025, followed by rapid runway development, with markings visible by October 2025
The airbase offers a number of potential advantages:
Surveillance umbrella: It provides a platform for continuous aerial surveillance over the Hodeida coastline, allowing for real-time tracking of Houthi launch sites and sea mining operations.
Smuggling interdiction: Situated at the entrance to the Red Sea’s smuggling routes, forces on Zuqar can intercept vessels trafficking arms from Iran before they reach the Yemeni mainland.
Special operations staging: The base could serve as a forward launching point for raids against Houthi maritime assets, bypassing the need to deploy from distant bases in Eritrea or Aden (the latter is the base for the internationally recognized Yemeni government, which is fighting the Houthis).
According to an October 27 report by the Washington DC-based Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Long War Journal, the development on Zuqar is not an isolated event but part of a series of Emirati attempts to assist anti-Houthi activity in the area. Its other efforts include an airstrip built at Perim (also known as Mayun) Island in the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and strategic positions in the Socotra Archipelago.
Zuqar Island was captured by the Houthis in 2014 but retaken in 2015 by the Saudi-backed anti-Houthi coalition. Ever since then, it has been under the control of the UAE-backed National Resistance Forces (NRF). The NRF is commanded by Brigadier General Tariq Saleh, a vice president in Yemen’s Presidential Leadership Council and nephew of the late former President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The NRF operates from Yemen’s western Red Sea coast city of Mocha. The NRF’s presence in that location allows the UAE to project power without a heavy footprint on the Yemeni mainland.
In July 2025, US Central Command (CENTCOM) released a statement congratulating the Yemeni NRF for “the largest seizure of Iranian advanced conventional weapons in their history,” noting that the force had seized over 750 tons of munitions and hardware, including hundreds of advanced cruise, anti-ship, and anti-aircraft missiles. The seizure also included warheads and seekers, drone engines, radar systems, communications systems, manuals in Persian, and systems made by a company affiliated with the Iranian Ministry of Defense.
While the NRF combats Iranian trafficking of arms to the Houthis along the Red Sea coast, the Southern Transitional Council (STC) controls the southern Yemenite governorates and the island of Socotra. The STC, led by Aidarous Al-Zubaidi, has openly aligned itself with the UAE’s foreign policy, including a willingness to normalize relations with Israel.
On November 27, the UAE company Global South Utilities said it would invest a billion dollars in electricity infrastructure for the anti-Houthi Yemini government in Aden.
Despite these developments, the Houthi movement remains resilient, bolstered by a deep entrenchment in northern Yemen and a persistent Iranian supply line that adapts to interdiction efforts.
Interrogations of crew members from the intercepted Al Sharwa vessel, released in August 2025 by the NRF, revealed the evolving methodology of the IRGC Quds Force. The crew, which included four Houthi-affiliated members trained in Iran, detailed a multi-vector smuggling strategy:
Route A (the “front door”): Overt use of commercial shipping from Iran’s Bandar Abbas Port to the Houthi-controlled port of Salif. This route is often used for dangerous cargo like rocket fuel but has reportedly been disrupted by Israeli and US airstrikes.
Route B (the “back door”): A “mother ship” anchored off the coast of Somalia acts as a floating warehouse. Cargo is transferred to local fishing boats for the final run to the Yemeni coast. The NRF’s base on Zuqar could be specifically positioned to monitor some of this traffic.
Faced with the penetration of their security apparatus, the Houthis have initiated a brutal internal purge.
In November 2025, the Houthi-controlled Specialized Criminal Court in Sanaa sentenced 17 individuals to death and detained 43 UN staff members on charges of espionage. The regime alleges the existence of a “Joint Operations Room” located in Saudi territory, staffed by US, Israeli, and Saudi intelligence officers, which coordinates sabotage and directs airstrikes.
Concurrently, the Houthis have reportedly intensified the fortification of their northern strongholds. Reports indicate a surge in tunnel excavation in the mountainous regions of Saada and Sanaa. These tunnels are intended to protect missile stockpiles and leadership from air attacks.
The emergence of a renewed anti-Houthi coalition represents an achievement for UAE’s quiet yet committed strategy. By securing the coastal nodes of Zuqar, Perim, and Socotra, and by empowering capable local forces, Abu Dhabi seems to have created a flexible mechanism with which to confront the Iranian-backed Houthi threat in the Red Sea.
https://besacenter.org/is-the-uae-deepening-its-strategic-involvement-against-the-houthis/