Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s visit to Cairo last Wednesday was not an ordinary one; rather, it marked a pivotal moment in Turkish-Egyptian relations, signalling the formation of a strategic alliance between the two countries.
The warm reception extended to the Turkish president by his Egyptian counterpart, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, carries significant implications, pointing to emerging security and military understandings, as well as political and economic cooperation agreements between Cairo and Ankara.
Cairo appears open to broader cooperation with the Turkish side, which has succeeded in easing political tensions between the two countries and in accelerating the pace of rapprochement, to compensate for the strategic losses incurred by both sides.
Sensitive Timing
The success of President Erdoğan’s third visit to Egypt within two years lies primarily in its sensitive timing. The region is facing a major escalation between the United States and Iran that could develop into a war. Should such a conflict erupt, it would cast a heavy shadow over the region, reignite tensions in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal, and potentially draw in regional actors, including Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and Shiite factions in Iraq. Israel could also exploit such a scenario to resume the war on the Gaza Strip.
The visit was marked by personal warmth between the two presidents—symbolized by Erdoğan’s gift of a Turkish-made car to El-Sisi—as well as by the nature of the agreements signed between the two sides and the signals they carry for the future. The two countries border five key seas—the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Sea of Marmara, and the Aegean—and control three vital international waterways: the Suez Canal, the Dardanelles, and the Bosphorus, according to Turkish affairs researcher Samir Al-Arki.
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The sensitive timing, Turkish pragmatism, Turkish-Saudi convergence on several regional issues, and Emirati overreach in the Sudan and Somalia files—at the expense of Egypt’s interests in its strategic backyard—all contributed to accelerating Cairo’s move toward further understandings and arrangements with Ankara.
The period between the first and second meetings of the Strategic Cooperation Council between the two countries saw approximately 50 official visits at various levels.
Egypt is Turkey’s largest trading partner in Africa, with a trade volume of $9 billion. According to Erdoğan, the aim is to establish an economic model in which the two countries complement one another, strengthening their resilience to global economic fluctuations.
Gaza and Iran
The Egyptian-Turkish agenda encompasses a wide range of issues and challenges, foremost among them the Gaza file. Coordination between the two countries is driven by shared interests in pressing Israel to adhere to the ceasefire agreement concluded at the Sharm El-Sheikh summit in October of last year, under Egyptian, Qatari, Turkish, and American sponsorship, as well as in reconstruction efforts, the opening of the Rafah crossing, the delivery of aid, and coordination on the tasks of the stabilization force in the Strip.
Egypt seeks to consolidate its role as a mediator in upholding the ceasefire agreement and preventing the displacement of Palestinians into Sinai, while Turkey aims to entrench its role in the Palestinian issue. Both countries also play a mediating role between Washington and Tehran and want U.S. President Donald Trump to rein in Israel’s actions in Gaza, according to political analyst Mohamed Gamal.
The impact of war on regional maritime routes, including the Suez Canal, the risk of a new refugee crisis, and fears that conflict could spread to Gulf and Arab states should Tehran respond to any military action against it all provide common ground for Egyptian-Turkish action to defuse escalation and prevent a slide toward war with Iran.
The region continues to bear the costs of two years of war and Israeli and American military escalation, affecting Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, Iran, and Qatar, alongside ongoing tensions in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
Sudan and Libya
The “summit to rearrange the region’s cards,” as described by the Egyptian state-run daily Al-Ahram, also reflected a shared desire to bring the war in Sudan to a decisive conclusion and tip the balance in favour of the Sudanese army, through the use of Turkish drones launched from Egyptian bases near the southern border. This marks a notable development indicating a higher level of military coordination between Egypt and Turkey.
Two Egyptian security officials told Reuters in recent days that two southern airports had been supplied with military equipment over the past months to secure the border and carry out military strikes to safeguard national security.
The New York Times also published images of Turkish-made Akinci drones at an Egyptian airbase in East Oweinat, stating that they were used to carry out airstrikes in Sudan.
The Egyptian-Turkish move is aimed at targeting the Rapid Support Forces militia and cutting off arms supply routes from southeastern Libya, following the fall of El-Fasher—the last stronghold of the Sudanese army in Darfur. This development helps explain the shift in Egypt’s position and its increased engagement in the conflict in support of the Sudanese army.
This significant development points to deeper coordination between Cairo and Ankara on further security understandings and arrangements in Libya, Somalia, and the Horn of Africa, after Egypt was encouraged by recent Saudi moves to curb Emirati influence in Yemen, the Red Sea, and Sudan.
Significant Gains
Egypt’s strategic calculations require easing regional tensions, containing conflict hotspots to the north, south, east, and west, and halting the strain on the Egyptian economy caused by declining revenues from the Suez Canal. These interests are served by closer ties with Turkey, which has moved toward a policy of “zero problems” with Egypt.
According to a Turkish source who spoke to Mada Masr (independent), Egypt needs Turkey in the fields of military industries and defence autonomy, while Turkey needs Egypt in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Last week, Egypt concluded agreements with Turkish companies to produce Hamza drones and establish a facility to manufacture long-range artillery ammunition for the Egyptian army, in addition to military deals worth $350 million that include the export of the TOLGA air defense system. This reflects a growing military partnership between Cairo and Ankara.
Earlier last year, Egypt’s Arab Organization for Industrialization and the Turkish company Havelsan signed an agreement to locally produce the Torkha (VTOL-UAV) drone in Egypt, aiming to localize unmanned aerial vehicle technology, strengthen industrial partnerships between the two countries, and open export channels to African markets.
A Trilateral Alliance
From rivalry and competition to cooperation and partnership, Egyptian-Turkish relations are entering a new phase that goes beyond the rupture following the military coup in Egypt in mid-2013.
The driving force behind this shift, according to political researcher Mohamed Hamdi, lies in Israeli moves in the region and the desire to manage regional crises rather than leave them hostage to external interventions, as well as to build relatively independent leverage that allows influence over regional issues instead of remaining confined to the role of observer—thereby enhancing regional stability and safeguarding shared interests.
There is near-complete alignment between the two countries around a single objective: sustainable de-escalation in Gaza; the unity and sovereignty of Sudan, Libya, Somalia, and Syria; the security of the Red Sea; and, potentially in the future, the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean. This convergence forms a strategic alliance—alongside Saudi Arabia—capable of exerting decisive influence across a wide range of regional issues.
Accordingly, Ankara has succeeded in setting aside differences with both Cairo and Riyadh and, through calm, patience, and political acumen, has arrived at the formula it had sought for years: a trilateral regional alliance among influential Arab and Islamic states, based on a “win-win” principle and capable of recalibrating strategic balances in the Middle East.
Under the heading “A New Axis,” prominent Egyptian journalist Farag Ismail wrote on his personal Facebook page that ad hoc axes have been neutralized and pushed into inward retreat, while a new axis is emerging naturally among the region’s influential geographic, military, and economic powers—Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—awaiting a fourth force: Iran, whose geopolitical, demographic, and cultural weight cannot be ignored. In contrast, axes that were “born by cesarean section” and ignited the region with border tensions, internal conflicts, and civil wars are set to fade.