Hayder Al-Shakeri
Hopes that reform of Iraq’s political system would be possible from within have been dashed by the poor electoral performance of candidates associated with the Tishreen protest movement.
In Iraq’s 11 November election, parties and figures associated with the Tishreen protest movement failed to win seats in parliament. The Tishreen movement emerged in 2019, demanding reform of Iraq’s political system. Dozens of civic and reform-oriented MPs subsequently entered parliament after the 2021 election, raising hopes that they could press for reform from within the political system.
These hopes have been dashed by the results of the 2025 election. An uneven political playing field and sustained pressure on non-establishment MPs have pushed Tishreen-aligned actors back to the margins of formal politics.
Parliament turned against its newcomers
After the 2021 election, many of the new, non-establishment MPs faced a mix of pressure, inducements and procedural obstacles that made it hard for them to work. Some were even targeted directly. MPs from the Imtidad party – a product of the Tishreen movement – were physically pushed out of a parliamentary session in 2023 after refusing to vote for changes to the electoral law, while the office of independent MP Sajad Salim was attacked after he criticized armed groups. Salim was also disqualified twice in the run-up to the 2025 election and had to file repeated legal appeals to return to the race. Such incidents send a clear message about the vulnerability of non-aligned MPs within Iraq’s political system.
Furthermore, MPs who refused to join large blocs were sidelined from influential committees, while established parties sought to buy them off with promises of positions, protection or access to resources. A number of MPs who had campaigned as independents or protest voices eventually joined establishment parties. Speaking at Chatham House event, former MP Mohammed Anouz said Iraq’s political system is highly resistant to reform because political elites continue to dominate both the political process and parliamentary structures, excluding those who are not part of the system.
Electoral collapse
By the time the 2025 campaign began, these structural pressures had taken their toll. Alaa al Rikabi, the former head of Imtidad, chose not to run again and publicly apologized to those who had backed him in 2021. Imtidad did not compete in these elections and its MPs were absorbed into other blocs – with predictably disappointing results. In 2021, Imtidad candidates received around 236,000 votes nationwide and secured 16 seats in parliament. 11 of those MPs ran again in 2025 and together received just over 20,000 votes. Preliminary results indicate that only one of them will return to parliament – although this time representing a different party.
Candidates who tried to distance themselves from the major blocs remained fragmented, under-resourced and struggled to persuade voters that another term would be any different. Instead of running on a single platform, they split across three different alliances – one of which was co-led by Salim – and their struggle was reflected in the results. Salim himself went from over 10,000 votes in 2021 to about 3,000 and lost his seat.
An uneven playing field
The difficulties faced by non-establishment MPs were compounded by an electoral environment that overwhelmingly favours parties already embedded in the state. Between 2022 and 2025, establishment parties used state resources to strengthen their position and limit the space available to civic actors. Control of ministries and provincial councils allowed them to distribute jobs, contracts and local projects to loyal networks.
The Political Parties Law of 2015, which bans parties from having armed wings and requires transparency in party financing, has remained largely dormant. Without serious enforcement of its core provisions, parties that combine access to state budgets and armed groups face few consequences, while groups that do not rely on coercion or public funds start each electoral race with a structural disadvantage.
Beyond the ballot box
The fact that Tishreen-linked parties have all but disappeared from parliament does not mean that Iraqis have accepted the political order. In many of the Shia majority cities where the 2019 protests took place, voter turnout was among the lowest in the country. This pattern suggests many former protesters chose to step back from an electoral process they no longer see as a vehicle for change.
In many of these areas there is clear voter apathy – but this does not equal political apathy. Iraqis remain highly engaged but choose to channel that engagement where they feel they can have an impact. Campaigns such as Save the Tigris are mobilizing public opinion around the future of the river and broader climate action, working with experts to push these issues forward. Similarly, some communities turn to local clerics to lead protests and negotiations, while others focus on improving their immediate surroundings and surviving within patronage-based systems.
What next for those who still want reform?
The 2025 election showed that protest momentum and visibility are not enough in a system that actively resists change. What should be the next steps for non-establishment candidates and civil society actors who still want to influence Iraq’s future?
First, they need to rebuild trust with their base, especially with the silent majority who did not vote. That means clearer communication that acknowledges distrust in the system and sets realistic expectations about what can be achieved, such as a slow and sustainable push for change rather than an overhaul of the system.
Second, unity is crucial. Joint platforms at governorate level, a shared policy agenda and agreements to collaborate rather than compete in the same districts would help avoid self-inflicted losses and show that non-establishment candidates can act collectively.Third, non-establishment candidates should put the creation of a level playing field at the top of their agenda. A key priority should be to push for the Political Parties Law to become more than simply a piece of paper. It must be enforced and applied to all parties.
The 2025 election showed that those who control the Iraqi state are rewarded, while those who seek to reform it are pushed out. To avoid facing the same structural disadvantages in future elections, reform candidates and wider civil society should use this defeat to shift the conversation towards changing the rules of the game.