Netanyahu’s government will seek to show strength in the West Bank, but a draft bill poses a looming crisis – as does an investigation into the cross-border attacks of 2023.
As January 2026 unfolds, the winter air in Jerusalem carries a weight that transcends the usual political manoeuvring in Israeli politics. This year will likely redefine both Israel’s political map and determine the future of the social contract.
Officially, the parliamentary elections are set for autumn. But if the Knesset fails to pass the 2026 state budget by 31 March, the government will dissolve automatically. The government just submitted the budget to the Knesset this week, with a two-month delay, constituting a violation of the law. There are doubts regarding its prospects for approval.
During the second half of 2025 there were many rumours of early elections. But Benjamin Netanyahu, ever the master of political survival, was uninterested in this gambit.
His calculation was and is still rooted in a stark polling contradiction: while his Likud party has shown a resilient recovery in the polls, the same polls show him falling short of forming a government with existing coalition allies – the ultra-orthodox and ultra-right wing parties. As it stands, the coveted 61-seat majority looks a distant prospect, trapped behind a wall of public fatigue and structural demographic shifts.
The months leading up to the autumn vote will be defined by a series of high-stakes manoeuvres by candidates who are running against Netanyahu or might play a significant role in a future coalition.
Benny Gantz – who left Netanyahu’s war cabinet in June 2024 and remains the perennial hope of the liberal-centre – finds himself in a familiar state of strategic ambiguity. While he has publicly declared he will not veto Netanyahu, it remains unclear whether he is prepared to be the prime minister’s ‘saving wheel’. Support for Gantz’s Blue and White party has collapsed to only 0.6 per cent of votes – not even close to the amount needed to secure a seat in the Knesset.
Meanwhile, former premier Naftali Bennett remains the ultimate wildcard. By refusing to explicitly rule out forming a government with Netanyahu, Bennett maintains a bridge to right-wing voters while positioning himself as the pragmatic alternative to the current chaos in Israeli politics, which has seen Netanyahu’s government initiate a renewed push for judicial reform, a wave of aggressive and controversial legislation (such as the death penalty for terrorists bill) and continued budget uncertainty.
The Arab card
Amidst this manoeuvring, the ‘Arab card’ has once again emerged as the most potent and polarizing element of the campaign.
The 2022 ‘Government of Change’ led by Bennett and Yair Lapid, proved that a ruling coalition could lean on the four seats of Ra’am, the Islamist party led by Mansour Abbas. Current polling indicates Ra’am would have five seats in the Knesset following a new election, making them a potentially important player in forming a new coalition.
In 2022, Likud criticised the Bennett/Lapid government for working with Abbas. A role for Ra’am today would be even more controversial. Indeed, Gantz’s Blue and White party is now leading a campaign against partnership with Ra’am out of fear of alienating the centre-right.
Yet it looks virtually impossible for the current opposition bloc to reach a 61-seat majority without Ra’am. Furthermore, there is a quiet, cynical consensus in Jerusalem that should Netanyahu find himself a few seats short of victory, he would jump into a partnership with Abbas in a heartbeat, incinerating his own past rhetoric for the sake of another term in office.
US relations
On the military and regional fronts, the landscape has been fundamentally reshaped by external dictates, most notably from the White House.
The various theatres of conflict opened on 7 October 2023 remain volatile. But they have settled into a permanent manner of managed instability.
In Gaza, the reality is no longer dictated by Netanyahu’s ‘Total Victory’ slogan, but by Donald Trump’s decisive move into the second phase of his peace plan.
Despite making vocal, televised criticisms, Netanyahu has found he can do little to obstruct a plan that includes a central role for Qatar and Turkey – both of whom now sit on the influential ‘Board of Peace’.
In the north, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) maintains its routine of tactical strikes against Hezbollah. But the prospect of a full-scale war has been deferred, if not entirely eliminated.
In Syria, Israeli kinetic actions have been noticeably curtailed by American-brokered understandings. And the Houthis in Yemen, once a primary disruptor, have been largely tamed, left to recover from a series of devastating aerial campaigns. Iran may yet create upheaval in 2026, if for instance the regime should fall.
Responsibility for 7 October – and the issue of conscription
This regional ‘cooling’ has forced the Netanyahu government to look elsewhere for a narrative of strength to offer its base. The West Bank has become that pressure valve. The Trump administration has been noticeably silent on the issue, even as settler violence has surged, and the creation of new Israeli settlements has moved into high gear.
This grim trend is set to continue as the government’s far-right elements attempt to extract gains on the ground to compensate for the lack of a decisive victory in Gaza.
Yet, for all the headlines the West Bank generates, it is unlikely to be the decisive factor in the 2026 election.
With few exceptions, both the mainstream opposition and the governing coalition share a fundamental view: that a Palestinian state is impermissible in the current climate.
Instead, the election will be won or lost on two other crucial issues. First is the question of Israel’s so-called ‘internal contract’. Netanyahu faces a mounting problem: the looming crisis of a draft bill that would continue exemptions of some ultra-orthodox Haredi men from conscription into the IDF.