US-Israeli strikes killed leadership and destroyed much of Iran’s arsenal, but Tehran retained governance, nuclear stockpiles, and Hormuz leverage. Iran imposed high economic costs. Strategic success remains uncertain; Iran is not a new global power.
In an interview, Jim Lamson discusses the ongoing regional conflict and sees an unclear picture when it comes to winners and losers.
Jim Lamson is a senior research associate at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, and a visiting research fellow with the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. His research focuses on Iranian weapons, space, and military issues. Previously, he worked for 23 years as an analyst with the Central Intelligence Agency, focusing on Iranian weapons and military matters, and served for more than five years in the Middle East. Diwan interviewed Lamson earlier this week for an update on the military situation in the war between the United States and Israel on the one side, and Iran and its allies on the other.
Michael Young: Would you describe this U.S. war with Iran as a fiasco?
Jim Lamson: I don’t know about describing it as such, but I would note that it remains unclear, and even doubtful, as of April 21, whether Israel and the United States were able to achieve their strategic goals in conducting both the 2025 and 2026 operations. I also think it is uncertain and doubtful whether the clear strategic, diplomatic, military, political, and economic costs to Israel, the United States, and the Gulf states outweigh the benefits gained thus far.
This uncertainty and doubt about whether the war is successful or worthwhile are based on at least three reasons, in my view: First, without a clear and consistent set of strategic goals, it is difficult to assess success or failure. Israel and the United States conveyed a mix—an unclear one at times—of apparent strategic goals, including removing the “imminent threat” of Iran, causing regime change (but change of regime makeup? Change of regime behavior? Change of an entire system of government?), degrading Iran’s power projection capabilities, and preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Also, Israeli and U.S. strategic goals at times appeared to diverge—for instance, regarding whether regime change was a goal or not. Also, their approaches to achieving their goals appeared to diverge: The United States appeared to be attempting coercive bargaining and trying to create leverage for negotiations, while Israel appeared simply to be trying to annihilate Iran—its military and industrial capabilities as well as its system of governance—as much as possible while the conflict lasted.
Second, although the U.S. and Israeli military operations appeared to achieve many aspects of their stated operational goals—such as degrading Iran’s nuclear capabilities, missile and drone arsenal and production capabilities, defense-industrial base, and internal security capabilities—it remains unclear if their extensive strikes will actually translate into strategic success.
And third, during the conflict, Iran was able to retain its system of governance, some of its nuclear capabilities (including its 400-kilogram stockpile of highly enriched uranium), and much of its missile and drone arsenal. Importantly, it was also able to impose severe economic costs on Israel and the Gulf states, disrupt commercial shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, and threaten to further increase economic costs, such as escalating attacks on Gulf energy and infrastructure targets and have the Houthis disrupt the Bab al-Mandab Strait.
Also, Iran forced Israel, the United States, and the Gulf states to burn through many critical, expensive, and slow-to-replenish offensive and defensive munitions. Thus, in my view, it remains to be seen whether and to what extent Israel and the United States will be able to translate their operational successes from 2025 and 2026 into strategic success.
MY: We seem to be in a sort of twilight zone between war and negotiations involving the United States and Iran, and it’s increasingly evident that neither side really wants to continue the war. From a purely military angle, how would you assess the outcome of the fighting between the United States and Israel on the one side, and Iran on the other? In other words, both sides are predicating their negotiating strategy on the outcome of the fighting, so which side do you feel can credibly claim to be prevailing militarily?
JL: In the military sphere, Israel and the United States were able to kill key members of Iran’s political-military leadership and chain of command, gain air superiority in key areas of Iranian airspace, and degrade or destroy much of Iran’s air and naval combat capabilities, air defenses, and missile and drone arsenal. However, they were unable to force Tehran to capitulate, to create the conditions for an overthrow of the regime, or to totally destroy Iran’s missile and drone arsenals and force a halt to Iranian missile and drone strikes. Importantly, Iran retained the capacity to continue strikes on Israel, U.S. bases in the Gulf, the Gulf countries’ energy and other infrastructure, and commercial and military ships in the Strait of Hormuz.
Iran was also able to impose high economic costs on Israel and the Gulf states, damage U.S. bases and missile defense assets in the region, and was able to force Israel, the United States, and Gulf states to burn through critical, expensive, and slow-to-replenish offensive and defensive munitions. However, it was unable to impose high costs on Israeli and U.S. military forces (apart from the expenditure of munitions) or disrupt their air and missile operations against Iran.
After all of that, each side retained the ability to threaten and impose serious costs on the other if the conflict resumes. If this was a war of peer adversaries, I would of course assess that Israel and the United States prevailed militarily, but this was an asymmetric war, pitting a weaker country against two nuclear-armed and vastly militarily and technologically superior adversaries. Thus, in this case, and in warfare in general, the military outcome can be less important than the strategic outcome, which remains unclear at this point.
MY: The United States is pursuing its blockade of Iranian ports, even though last week the Iranians claimed to have reopened the Strait of Hormuz. Over the weekend, the U.S. Navy seized an Iranian cargo ship, while Donald Trump announced that negotiations with Tehran would resume in Islamabad (which has yet to happen). Where is this give-and-take over the strait leading, and what do you see as the likely outcome?
JL: Simply put, it could continue as is, with the continuation of limited tit-for-tat actions. It could escalate, or it could deescalate, and either escalation or deescalation could occur very quickly. I fear it could escalate both vertically and horizontally, in terms of strikes on commercial shipping, both sides returning to attacking each other’s military forces, the United States resuming air and missile attacks on Iranian military and non-military targets, Iran resuming missile and drone attacks on Gulf economic targets, and Iran getting the Houthis to conduct attacks against the Gulf states and disrupting the Bab al-Mandab Strait. However, if both sides decide to avoid escalation, things could deescalate quickly as well, with both sides agreeing to resume meaningful negotiations and open the Strait of Hormuz for commercial shipping. It is obviously a very unstable and unpredictable situation.
MY: Until now, we haven’t had much detail on the destruction caused by Iranian missiles in Israel, although until the ceasefire Iran was continuing to fire them, suggesting their launch capacity remained significant. What is your assessment of the impact of these weapons on Israel, and in light of this, how essential are such weapons to the Iranians?
JL: As you said, the extent of the damage to Israel remains unclear, but from what I can tell, Iranian missiles and drones appeared to exact high costs against some Israeli energy, economic, and other nonmilitary targets, and also to force Israel to burn through a good deal of its critical, expensive, and slow-to-replenish interceptors. However, it appears that Iran’s strikes were unable to impose significant damage on Israel’s military capabilities, including those key to its conduct of air and missile attacks against Iran. In my view, just as during the decades leading up to the 2025 and 2026 wars, Iran will continue to view its missiles and drones as critical to its deterrence and warfighting strategy, and will devote a high priority to trying to rebuild and improve those capabilities.
MY: How would you evaluate the capacity of Iran’s paramilitary and security forces, namely the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij, to continue to protect the present regime? While there have been no signs regime change is even possible, some reports have spoken of rifts within the ruling hierarchy in the country. What are your thoughts?
JL: This one is outside my lane of expertise, but for what it’s worth, the IRGC Ground Forces, Basij, Intelligence Ministry, FARAJA (the Law Enforcement Forces), and also the Artesh Ground Forces were extensively targeted during the bombing in the last seven weeks. However, it is unclear to me to what extent those forces were degraded, especially in terms of being able to carry out their internal security missions. This is another area of uncertainty, but I have seen no indications that these forces are unable to maintain internal security or that there are serious rifts among them that would cause instability.
MY: One U.S. commentator, Robert Pape, has made the bold statement that Iran is emerging as a fourth center of global power. Do you agree?
JL: I don’t agree. Iran’s influence over the Strait of Hormuz may be an important point of leverage, perhaps in the same way that Iran has used its latent nuclear capabilities as leverage; but enough to make Iran a fourth center of global power? I don’t think so. However, it’s an interesting argument, and I could be wrong, of course.