Strait of Hormuz is currently at the center of a fundamental legal transformation proposed by Tehran. Following the forty-day war, the Strait of Hormuz governing rules are shifting away from free transit. Officials emphasize that the Strait of Hormuz will now operate under strict Iranian military oversight. Ultimately, the Strait of Hormuz represents a new strategic reality.
The New Command of the Strait of Hormuz
In the wake of the forty-day war between Iran and the United States-Israel, no one expected that the governing legal regime of the Strait of Hormuz would undergo a fundamental transformation. Tehran’s stance, emerging from the recent war, is not be a return to the previous legal order of free transit, but rather a fundamental reorientation of rights and responsibilities within this chokepoint.
Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the speaker of Iran’s Islamic Consultative Assembly and Iranian top negotiator after the demise of Ayatollah Khamanei, has emphasised the Islamic Republic’s complete control over the Strait of Hormuz as a strategic chokepoint. He reiterated: “Traffic through this passage will only be carried out based on designated routes and with Iran’s permission. The opening or closing of the Strait of Hormuz and its regulations will be determined by the ‘field’ (Iran’s military forces) and based on national interests, not foreign claims.”
Innocent Passage vs. Transit in the Strait of Hormuz
The linchpin of this new posture rests on the collapse of the doctrine of innocent passage for a specific category of vessels—namely, those flagged to the United States and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf that served as launching pads for military aggression against Iran.
In its maritime zones’ law of 1993, Iran assumed the “right of innocent passage”, rather than “transit passage”, as the basis for its territorial waters and Hormuz Strait. Iran did not ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which assumes transit passage for the straits such as Hormuz. According to this convention and the 1958 Geneva Convention on seas, innocent passage requires that a ship not be prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal state.
Verification Measures within the Strait of Hormuz
They have become instruments of belligerency, and Iran retains the sovereign right, codified in customary international law and Article 51 of the UN Charter, to verify the nature, cargo, and destination of such vessels before permitting transit. This is not a blanket closure of the strait but a calibrated security measure, to ensure the security of an interested coastal state.
The corollary to mandatory verification is the incurring costs. Safe navigation through a waterway that has been used as non-innocent by foreign adversaries is no longer a costless public good. Iran will bear the financial burden of monitoring, inspecting, and ensuring the innocence passage in the strait. Consequently, it is both logical and lawful for Tehran to demand fees from commercial shipping, particularly from entities originating from hostile nations, to cover these heightened security and verification expenses. Such fees mirror standard port state controls, pilotage and environmental levies which have been allowed in Article 261 of UNCLOS; it is not a violation of the freedom of navigation but a user charge for a secure and innocent passage.
Economic Reciprocity and the Strait of Hormuz
The United States has for decades weaponised its financial system to block Iranian oil exports, freeze Iranian assets, and penalise any third country trading with Tehran. These sanctions violate the foundational principles of free trade and the sovereign equality of states by imposing US domestic policy on the global community. Under the principle of reciprocity which was recognised by the International Law and as a common practice by states, a state injured by an internationally wrongful act—here, the coercive sanctions that have strangled Iran’s economy—may take non-forcible measures against the responsible state to induce compliance.
Restricting the innocent passage of US-linked vessels and imposing transit fees is a proportionate response to the economic warfare the US has waged. If Washington can unilaterally choke Iran’s access to global markets, then Tehran can reciprocally choke the maritime mobility of US assets. This is global accepted tit- for- tat policy as well as a legal rebalancing.
Strategic Guarantees for the Strait of Hormuz
Iran honored its commitments under the JCPOA for over a year after the US reneged, but incurred additional sanctions in return. Given this negative track record, any future diplomatic settlement between Tehran and Washington—be it a renewed nuclear accord or a broader peace deal—must be structurally guaranteed.
The most credible guarantee, in a realist sense, is not a signature on a piece of paper but a physical alteration of the strategic environment. By permanently embedding verification requirements and transit fees into the legal regime of the Strait of Hormuz, Iran ensures that the US cannot simply promise to behave peacefully and then revert to hostility.
The strait becomes an enforcement mechanism: if the US violates a future agreement, Iran can immediately and legally tighten restrictions further without reinventing its legal framework. Thus, the new restrictions transform a fragile verbal promise into a durable, self-enforcing strategic reality.
Global Burden Sharing and the Strait of Hormuz
Finally, Iran believe that it alone should not shoulder the costs of US worldwide unilateralism and bullying while the rest of the world enjoys a free ride. The states such as China, Japan, and so on benefit enormously from the flow of Persian Gulf oil and the stability of the strait.
Yet they contribute nothing to confront the US bullying and unfair policy towards Iran. By establishing a new regime and levying passage fees, while continuing to allow passage to neutral and friendly nations like China with minimal interference, Iran effectively will hinder non-innocent passage of any likely adversaries. This compels the international community—especially Asian and European consumers of the Persian Gulf energy—to internalize the reality that US aggression creates cost for all.
Those who wish to preserve low-cost, secure transit must either pressure the US to abandon its sanctions and military posturing or accept that Iran will rationally price the risk to all interested countries.
In this sense, Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz is a burden-sharing mechanism, redistributing the costs of US unilateralism away from Tehran’s sole ledger and onto the global supply chain. It is neither a reckless escalation nor a violation of maritime law, but a sober, post-war legal adaptation to a new strategic reality—one where innocence as well as trust has been tarnished, so free secure navigation must be earned, not assumed. This is Tehran’s vision of the new legal regime for the Hormuz Strait.