Jason Campbell analyzes the strategic failures of the current Iran conflict. With depleted munitions and rising casualties, the U.S. is pivoting toward ground operations that offer high risk and dubious rewards against an adversary prepared for long-term regional struggle.
“Tactics without strategy is the noise before defeat” is a well-known axiom attributed to the ancient Chinese military general and strategist, Sun Tzu. With the Iran war now at the one-month mark, it is evident that the Trump administration failed to outline a clear end state or devise a workable war termination strategy before initiating Operation Epic Fury on February 28. In the first couple of weeks senior officials offered a grab bag of feasible objectives mixed with what could charitably be called strategic “hopes.” Yet it seems increasingly clear that aspirations for regime change, unconditional surrender, or President Donald Trump choosing a new supreme leader are unlikely at best, and may be, as former Secretary of Defense James Mattis recently stated, “delusional” and “nonsense.”
Another now obvious point is that assumptions about the duration and overall value of the operation were underestimated and overstated, respectively. In the opening weeks of the operation, senior administration officials made every effort to avoid referring to a “war” against Iran. While this was due in part to a lack of Congressional authorization, it was also aimed at conveying that the operation would conclude quickly. Trump himself tried to bill Epic Fury as a “little excursion,” claiming that “we’ve already won but we need to win some more.” He has now settled into referring to it as only a “military operation.” Yet the absence of a clearly articulated strategy has persistently left the United States on its back foot when operational expectations prove mistaken. The war is unquestionably achieving its military goals, but the economic and diplomatic balances are swinging in the opposite direction, and they may prove decisive.
Iran’s immediate horizontal escalation against the energy exports and civilian infrastructure of the Gulf states caught the US off guard, as did its willingness to hit not only American and Israeli interests but also those of key regional partners. When Iran effectively “closed” the Strait of Hormuz for commercial shipping, the US awkwardly and briefly attempted to build a coalition of nations to help reopen it, going so far as to even reach out to China. As Iran’s drone and missile strikes have persisted, the US has had to send additional advanced air and missile defense systems from other theaters. These steps reflect an administration struggling to compensate for a lack of adequate planning. With the limitations of an airpower-centric operation against an adversary as large and resilient as Iran becoming apparent, recent discussions have focused on the deployment of ground forces. Once again, however, US officials are scrambling to compile options for a contingency they never expected.
Costs are already adding up
Over the first four weeks of the Iran war, the US has already incurred significant costs. Thirteen US service members have been killed and more than 300 wounded. Additionally, the volume and precision of Iranian drone and missile attacks have rendered many of the US bases throughout the region so dangerous that service members have had to evacuate to “alternative” locations. The war is also drawing down key military assets at a rate that is negatively affecting global readiness. According to one estimate, in the first 16 days of the conflict, the US, Israel, and key Gulf partners expended more than 11,000 munitions (offensive and defensive) at a cost of roughly $26 billion. For the US, this has translated to over 45% of its offensive ATACMS and precision strike (PrSM) missiles and nearly 40% of its terminal high-altitude area defense (THAAD) interceptors. Israel and our Gulf partners appear to be in even more dire positions on a number of both offensive and defensive munitions. Underscoring the severity of the situation, recent reports suggest that the Pentagon is considering diverting military aid from Ukraine to the Middle East. Finally, in terms of funding, President Trump confirmed that the administration will be requesting an additional $200 billion to cover the costs of the war and subsequent replenishing of munitions and other assets. This is on top of an annual Department of Defense budget that eclipsed $1 trillion for the first time in fiscal year 2026. By way of comparison, the entire eight years of the Iraq war cost around $815 billion in direct expenditures.
The next escalation?
The administration has sent contradictory public signals about the sensitive issue of deploying ground forces. Since early March, President Trump has repeatedly said he has no plan to put American boots on the ground in Iran, but refused to dismiss the possibility outright. Yet on March 13, the 31st Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), based in Okinawa, Japan, departed for the region, arriving at the end of March. Then, during a press briefing on March 19, Trump proclaimed, “I’m not putting troops anywhere.” The very next day, however, the 11th MEU, based at Camp Pendelton in California, was reportedly also ordered to depart for the Middle East. On March 24, Trump ordered the deployment to the region of two infantry battalions currently assigned to the 82nd Airborne Division’s Immediate Response Force, as well as the division headquarters unit. Finally, on March 26 reports indicated that the administration was considering sending yet another 10,000 ground forces, though as of this writing no details about the unit or even specific service have been announced.
At this stage, it is unclear whether these units will ultimately contribute to an operation or serve as a messaging tool intended to shape Iran’s negotiating calculus. Collectively, these units amount to roughly 16,000-17,000 ground forces that include artillery, air elements (fixed- and rotary-wing, transport and attack), amphibious landing vehicles, naval attack ships, and sustainment. While formidable, the limited size of the force has led to speculation that it will be ordered to capture Kharg Island, Iran’s primary port for oil exports, or a smattering of smaller islands closer to the Strait of Hormuz.
As with previous attempts to build a coalition two weeks into an operation struggling to find success, the White House and Pentagon appear to be doing things backwards. Typically, planning would commence with a well-defined articulation of the strategic objectives and proceed with a clear-eyed assessment of the costs and likely risks involved. If approved, the Pentagon would then consider the most appropriate assets to commit to the operation. In this case, however, it seems the Pentagon is calling on these units simply because they are contingency forces prepared to deploy on immediate notice. This brings added risk since without a more robust mobilization of ground forces, the Pentagon will not have any reserves to call on should these units become overwhelmed.
The strategic case remains unclear
Even as speculation continues about whether Trump will put boots on the ground and how they might be used, the administration has still not articulated a clear strategic end state. Kharg Island is central to the Iranian economy and halting oil exports from there would indeed cause some pain. Yet during both this war and the lifetime of the Islamic Republic, Tehran has demonstrated a willingness to endure significant economic and military hardship. The first Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign against Iran effectively reduced their average daily oil exports from over 2.1 million barrels per day (bpd) in 2017 to just over 400,000 bpd by 2020 (with other reports showing average daily exports cratering to below 250,000 bpd during the same year). By 2024, Iran was able to once again increase its average daily exports to 1.5 million bpd and even inched up to 1.6 million bpd in 2025. If the regime was able to withstand drastic and prolonged cuts to its oil exports then, how would that change now? Or, more pointedly, how long would US forces need to occupy Kharg before it significantly altered Iran’s strategic calculus?
Another potential objective of US forces could be one or more of the small islands closer to where the Persian Gulf meets the Strait of Hormuz, such as Larak or the disputed islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs. Once again, this may deprive Iran of a staging point for its fast attack boats and other resources capable of controlling access to the strait, but it has at its disposal any number of alternative options along its lengthy and rugged coastline it can employ to maintain this capability. Even if some portion of the US force was sent to secure strategic locations on the Iranian side of the strait, the amount of ground they could hold would be very limited, and the shipping lanes would still be well within range of most if not all Iranian threats. Ultimately, Iran does not need to keep the strait and Persian Gulf under constant bombardment to stymie shipping, but only to persistently demonstrate that it has the capability to do so. Shipping firms’ economic interests and the dictates of the insurance market will take care of the rest. As with Kharg, a US takeover of these islands or even minimal beachheads on the mainland would be an operational nuisance for the regime but would have limited impact on their stranglehold on the strait or desire to continue to inflict punishment on the US, Israel, and other regional partners.
Moreover, the risks of such an approach will be substantial for US ground forces. Watching US developments closely, Iran is reportedly fortifying Kharg in preparation for a US invasion. Iranian ground forces armed with shoulder-fired, surface-to-air guided missile systems (MANPADS), anti-personnel and anti-armor mines, and other “layered defenses” will make for a challenging landing and takeover. Moreover, senior Iranian officials have threatened not only to exert significant fires on any US forces entering the region, but to also target “vital infrastructure” throughout the Gulf “without restriction.” Given Iran’s willingness thus far to strike at ports, airports, and other civilian targets in the Gulf, there is little reason to doubt such threats.
High risk, dubious strategic reward
Deprived of a hoped for and even anticipated quick victory in Iran, the Trump administration has struggled to compensate for a lack of clear strategic direction with an array of measures. This has included mixed and at times contradictory rhetoric, fluctuating demands, and efforts to incorporate new partners and introduce supplementary military assets. Coupled with persistent airstrikes, this has resulted in a series of incremental escalations that have now reached an inevitable consideration thought implausible until recently: the insertion of US ground forces. Yet having failed to incorporate this into its initial planning, the Pentagon has had to scramble to deploy small numbers of primarily contingency forces with limited strategic utility in this environment. Should these forces be used as expected, they will be vulnerable to near constant bombardment as they approach and attempt to hold their position. As a result, the US will almost certainly need to pull other assets away from striking Iran to protect these ground units instead. This is a significant amount of risk to take on for an operation that will at best be a temporary annoyance for an Iranian regime accustomed to hardship and at worst a catastrophic failure resulting in high levels of US casualties.