Despite 61% rejecting the Iran ceasefire, only 30% believe Israel damaged the regime. The Super-Sparta model of eternal readiness faces a 15,000-troop shortage. Polls show the coalition dropping to 49-51 seats, unable to govern without Arab parties.
Most Israelis support continued conflict with Iran and Hezbollah. But polls show fewer believe in the government’s ability to deliver victory.
As of April 2026, Israel’s security landscape is defined by a profound paradox. While the national mood is characterized by strategic fatigue due to a lack of decisive victories, Israeli society still maintains significant support for the multi-front campaign against Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon.
However, this endurance is being tested by a government attempting to institutionalize a state of permanent low/mid-intensity warfare – a vision labelled the ‘Super-Sparta’ model by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
Recent polling suggests that while the public supports the war’s objectives, it increasingly resents the current government’s inability to define or deliver a decisive end-state. That has left the governing coalition unable to use the war to grow its support. Meanwhile, the opposition is gaining a few seats but still appears unlikely to form a government in this year’s elections without cooperation with Arab parties.
The Iranian front: The mirage of regime collapse
A central pillar of the early Israeli war effort was the strategic assumption that direct military pressure would catalyse the internal collapse of the Islamic Republic. After almost seven weeks of war, these assessments appear premature. Despite sustaining significant military blows, the Iranian regime has demonstrated asymmetric resilience.
At the same time, the nuclear issue, and specifically the fate of Iran’s 460 kilograms of enriched uranium, remains unresolved. Notably, any forthcoming agreement appears likely to resemble the 2015 JCPOA framework – the very deal the Netanyahu administration spent a decade dismantling.
According to recent INSS poll, an overwhelming 61 per cent of the Israeli public rejects the ceasefire, while just 29 per cent support it. The same poll shows that in the beginning of the war 69 per cent believed the Iranian regime will be ‘significantly damaged’ in the conflict. Today, only 30.5 per cent believe that damage has occurred.
That leaves the ceasefire with Iran – extended this week by US President Donald Trump – viewed in Israel as little more than a fragile tactical pause, with no decisive end to the war in sight and the IDF indicating that it is ready for the renewal of hostilities.
Back to Lebanon
Direct negotiations between Israel and Lebanon took place in Washington on 14 April – drawing surprisingly little attention in Israeli media.
Sure, the expectations for the talks were and are still very low, and the difficulties are well known. The Lebanese government means well, but it is still very weak and unable to disarm Hezbollah – even after the group joined the Iranian war effort and dragged Lebanon into another war.
At the same time, the belief in eventual peace with neighbouring Arab countries – as reflected in many Israeli popular songs and folklore – seems to have died away. According to The Israel Democracy Institute poll, 80 per cent of Jewish respondents replied that warfare in Lebanon should continue regardless of developments in Iran. (66 per cent of Arabs were against continued fighting).
The sudden (yet expected) announcement by President Trump regarding the ceasefire in Lebanon left Netanyahu little room for manoeuvre: just a few days earlier, he had insisted that there was no ceasefire in Lebanon, implying the Lebanon campaign was not connected to that against Iran.
The Lebanon ceasefire brokered by the Trump administration is perceived in Israel mostly as an American imposition rather than a strategic choice. This has fuelled domestic criticism of Netanyahu’s government, particularly in northern Israel. Residents of border towns and kibbutzim, who remain under the threat of Hezbollah fire, view the government’s policies as a failure of sovereignty. Many demand to renew the fighting ‘until the job is done’.
The West Bank and the Gaza deadlock
Simultaneously, the government is utilizing the regional focus on Iran to accelerate hardline policies in the West Bank.
The displacement of Palestinian communities and the escalation of state-backed violence have continued largely unabated, further complicating the prospects for long-term regional stability.
The Israeli security cabinet approved the legalization of over 30 new settler outposts and farms in the West Bank last month, accelerating the process of de-facto annexation.
In Gaza, the discourse has shifted back toward an inevitable return to large-scale warfare.
The failure of the US-led Board of Peace to secure the disarmament of Hamas, coupled with Hamas’s refusal to give up its remaining military capabilities, has created a security vacuum.
The Super-Sparta model and the manpower crisis
Despite the current relative calm, it is clear that none of the fronts – in Lebanon, Gaza, West Bank, Syria, Iran or Yemen – has been fully closed. Any of them might reopen on any given day. And it seems that Benjamin Netanyahu, a man who was for many years referred to as ‘risk-averse’, now prefers this state of constant warfare of different intensity.
His concept of ‘Super-Sparta’ – a society in a state of eternal military readiness – has moved from a rhetorical provocation to a concrete policy framework. The government is currently signalling an intent to normalize extended military service and a permanent high-alert status for the civilian economy.
However, this model faces a fundamental obstacle: the limits of Israel’s human and material resources: The IDF long ago recognized that it is facing a significant manpower crisis. 15,000 soldiers are missing, according to the Chief of Staff.
The reliance on a weary reserve pool, mobilized repeatedly since 2024, has led to economic strain and societal erosion. There is a growing disconnect between the government’s desire for a ‘never-ending’ war of attrition, its inability to draft Ultraorthodox citizens into the Israeli Defense Forces, and the public’s demand for clear, tangible results. The Super-Sparta vision requires a level of military capacity that the current Israeli infrastructure simply cannot sustain without total socio-economic restructuring.
No coalition without the Arab parties
In the shadow of war, the government was at least able to pass its budget without losing the Ultraorthodox party. That is a significant achievement that allows it to continue functioning until elections, due later in the year.
But the latest polling data from mid-April 2026 reveals a significant shift in the Israeli electorate. An April 16 Haaretz/Channel 12 poll projects the current coalition would plummet to 51 seats in the Knesset in an election held now. Maariv places it even lower, at 49.
According to the Channel 12 poll, the opposition has surged to a formidable 69 seats – including Arab parties – while the Jewish opposition holds 59 seats, putting it on the cusp of a majority without requiring a coalition with non-Zionist factions.
This leaves Israel standing at a critical juncture. The attempt to transform the state into a ‘Super-Sparta’ is an acknowledgment that short, decisive conflicts have been replaced by regional escalation.
However, the lack of a parliamentary majority and a sustainable solution to the manpower crisis means the government is overextending the very society it seeks to protect. The endurance of the Israeli public is a strategic asset, but it is being traded for a state of perpetual mobilization that lacks both a defined clear military victory and a viable political pathway beyond.
While the public remains broadly supportive of the war’s necessity, the early euphoria about successful military operations and fast achievements has been replaced by scepticism – and disbelief in the ability of the ruling coalition to run the war, defend Israel’s priorities and live up to its promises.