Trump’s strained alliance relations weaken his Beijing negotiating hand, as US partners forge independent China ties for commercial gain. Initiatives like Pax Silica and FORGE show coordinated approaches work. Rebuilding allied unity on shared red lines is essential.
The US alliance structure has reached a Pivotal turning point as Washington navigates a landscape of strained international ties. While the administration pursues Decisive bilateral gains, the erosion of the US alliance structure has created a Severe disadvantage in high-stakes negotiations with Beijing.
As President Trump arrives in China, the state of the US alliance structure serves as an Urgent reminder that unilateralism often undermines the collective leverage required to manage a Rising global competitor.
The US alliance structure faces a massive strain
President Trump travels to Beijing this week with the US’s alliance structure under enormous strain. Washington has fewer partners at its side, and a weaker hand to play. It doesn’t have to be this way. Alone, the US has leverage against Beijing, through controlling access to its advanced chips, sanctions on Chinese purchases of Iranian oil, and a consumer market Beijing can’t ignore.
But Washington’s allies and partners provided strength that China has struggled to compete with – acting as force multipliers, aligning with the US on shared vulnerabilities.
The Trump administration’s dismissal of such countries has created justified resentment. Many of America’s closest partners, buffeted by threats to NATO and tariffs, have concluded that US commitment may be a relic of the past. That is leading them to forge independent approaches to China, beginning with commercial ties.
Beijing today benefits from greater economic connectivity with US partners and allies, fewer multilateral structures to bind its behaviour, and little political will on either side of the Atlantic to advance common projects.
Yes, allied cohesion on China has always been aspirational, limited by different risk perceptions and economic pressures. But US and allied approaches have increasingly diverged since January 2025. And the current situation weakens the US negotiating position, even on President Trump’s ‘America First’ terms.
Strategic gaps in the US alliance structure
Greater alignment by the US with its traditional partners on China policy – covering issues like critical minerals, semiconductors, synthetic drugs and beyond – is still possible and of benefit to both Washington and allied capitals. It shouldn’t be cast aside.
Beijing cashes in
Today, the floor has fallen out of the US alliance structure, as relations with partners and allies has deteriorated.
The US has retreated from multilateral organizations, questioned the role of NATO, divided the G7 over tariffs, further hollowed out the WTO, launched UN-alternative structures like the Board of Peace, and gone to war with Iran.
This has pushed allies to chart independent paths, leaving China to take advantage. While the US spent the winter focused on Venezuela, Greenland and Iran, Beijing focused on commercial diplomacy.
In January, South Korean President Lee Jae Myung announced a ‘full scale restoration of ties’ between Seoul and Beijing, backed by new agreements on economic and trade cooperation, science and technology and the digital economy.
Two weeks later, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney announced a comprehensive ‘strategic partnership’ with Beijing covering energy, agriculture, and Chinese electric vehicles, amounting to CAD$3 billion in new export orders for Canada.
UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer’s subsequent visit netted £2.2 billion in export deals and around £2.3 billion in market access.
Trade shifts within the US alliance structure
In February, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, though citing ‘difficult issues’ in trade relations, agreed to strengthen Germany’s ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ with Beijing through 17 bilateral cooperation agreements.
Trump will also seek bilateral deals – on products like American soybeans and Boeing aircraft, on top of the NVIDIA chips he recently approved for sale to China, despite national security concerns.
Benefits are therefore rapidly accruing to Beijing. If the US and its traditional allies cannot develop a collective bargaining strategy, grouping their economies along similar red lines, China will only extend its run.
DC’s demolition derby lays a few floorboards
The floor of the US alliance structure cannot be rebuilt overnight, and its foundations were always imperfect. But two significant agreements indicate the Trump administration has realized that – in discrete instances – Trump’s ‘I alone can fix it’ instincts don’t work.
Pax Silica, launched by the US in December 2025, aims to shore up silicon supply chains for semiconductor manufacturing and AI development. With 14 partners and counting, the initiative sees ‘allies and trusted partners’ like Australia, Finland, Greece, Japan, Norway, South Korea, and the UK align to reduce dependency on critical technology from China. Its viability will take time to evaluate, but this novel grouping addresses a common concern, and will only become more effective as it expands.
Strengthening the US alliance structure via FORGE
Meanwhile, to break dependencies on China’s critical minerals, the US launched the new Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE), alongside co-chair Japan. They and 52 other partners now belong to a preferential trade-and-investment zone for critical minerals, guaranteeing price floors.
Like Pax Silica, it’s still early days. And shifting White House attention risks limiting full implementation. But both are encouraging datapoints that the Trump administration is slowly realizing that American unilateralism undercuts American power in certain instances.
New constructions, with or without a foreman
Washington, European capitals, and Indo-Pacific allies should build on such initiatives, identifying areas where working with allies is clearly to the advantage of all.
This can take a few forms. First, groupings like Pax Silica and FORGE should be bolstered by renewed efforts to bring in new country signatories and investments. Strengthening these groups will both improve members’ hands with Xi and promise material benefits to all its participants.
Establishing or reviving other groupings, for instance on synthetic drug interdiction, is another obvious area for close US cooperation with allies. Fentanyl is a continuing source of American overdose deaths, with the US claiming that many of the chemicals used in its production originate in China.
Rebuilding the US alliance structure for stability
But the Trump administration chose not to extend US leadership of a nearly 160 country coalition to counter production and distribution of illicit substances.
Revitalizing this network should be a priority. Both Biden and Trump hammered Xi on fentanyl, and US overdose deaths have fallen since 2023, possibly due in part to US diplomacy. But without a wider grouping of concerned partners, success may be limited or short-lived.
It is also crucial that trade talks by the US, Canada and Mexico starting in July are a success and deliver real constraints on China’s investments in North American manufacturing. Allowing internal divisions to prevent a protective arrangement would be an own goal and play into China’s strategy.
Rebuilding without Washington
Finally, US allies and partners must identify shared red lines for bilateral cooperation with China that will be upheld independent of Washington. Most countries have national China strategies, and all have identified red lines for bilateral cooperation. But internal limits are not the same as a shared approach.
The logic of greater allied alignment remains sound even where US commitment is uncertain. If allies can establish common approaches on China policy in other areas, it may manage Washington’s frustration with their hedging.
And finding agreement may also prove useful for the future: the US may become more cooperative on some issues after President Trump leaves office. And the US’s structural rivalry with China looks likely to endure through successive administrations for some time to come.
Coalitions work when they address a shared vulnerability, with agreement on the nature of the threat, with consultation before action, and with effective implementation – as is being achieved on critical minerals and semi-conductors. They fail when countries feel bullied, coerced, or reject the framing of the concern – as the failed attempt to assemble a Hormuz coalition illustrated.
China has no reason to abandon a divide-and-deal strategy that is working. Washington, arriving in Beijing largely alone this week, has every reason to try something different. The strongest hand it can play is the credible threat of coordinated action by a like-minded bloc of countries.
The US must therefore boost those areas where it has found common cause with allies. And where Washington is still troublesome to deal with, those allies should create their own shared path on dealing with China. Anything else risks continued disarray – something that Beijing is betting on.