Saudi Arabia faces converging conflicts that expose limits of US protection. Riyadh diversifies through Mecca Pact and China but finds no substitute, revealing broader erosion of American security guarantees globally.
The kingdom of Saudi Arabia finds itself suspended between a receding American security guarantee and an unsettled regional order that offers no immediate replacement. Riyadh’s strategic predicament illustrates a broader fracture in the global system: a superpower still indispensable to its partners yet increasingly unwilling to absorb the costs of their defense.
Saudi Dependency on Washington’s military umbrella has not disappeared, but the reliability of that protection has eroded under the weight of multiple converging conflicts, including the US-Iran war, Houthi advances in Yemen, and attacks on Saudi oil infrastructure. Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has responded by diversifying partnerships—signing the Mecca Pact with Pakistan and Türkiye, quietly cooperating with Israel, and even asking China to intercede with Tehran—yet none of these alternatives can substitute for American power in the near term. The result is a paradoxical condition: Saudi Dependency remains acute, even as confidence in the guarantor declines. This dilemma is not unique to Riyadh.
Allies across Europe and East Asia face similar anxieties as US weapons stockpiles deplete and presidential intentions fluctuate. Strategic dependencies built over decades cannot be undone in months. The kingdom must therefore hug Washington tightly while hoping that new relationships mature, and it may even pursue a temporary détente with Iran to buy stability. The Saudi case exposes how a moment in which the US remains vital but less reliable leaves partners adrift.
Saudi Dependency Defines Strategic Vise
The world is in a strange liminal space, between a decaying, American-led order and some new geopolitical structure that has yet to cohere. Witness the strategic dilemmas Saudi Arabia faces in a violent, unsettled Middle East.
Converging conflicts have put the vulnerable kingdom in a strategic vise — and shown that Saudi Arabia may not be able to rely on an ambivalent US in the future, even though it can’t do without American help just yet.
Initially, the US-Iran war wasn’t so bad for Saudi Arabia and its de facto ruler, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. The kingdom showed resilience, partially offsetting the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by sending more oil by pipeline to the Red Sea. Its primary rival for influence on the Arabian Peninsula, the United Arab Emirates, was being pummeled by Iranian attacks.
The threat of a double blockade — Iran closing Hormuz and the Houthis sealing the Bab el-Mandeb Strait at the entrance to the Red Sea — was reportedly mitigated by Saudi payments that kept the Houthis quiet.
In recent weeks, though, the kingdom has been taking heavy blows. An Iranian-backed militia in Iraq used drones to shut down the East-West pipeline, temporarily eliminating Saudi Arabia’s ability to export oil via its Red Sea coast. That strike forced Saudi Arabia to send oil through the dangerous Hormuz route; it has shown that Iran and its proxies can attack Hormuz and its workarounds.
Meanwhile, the war between the Saudis and Houthis in Yemen reignited. After a four-year truce collapsed this summer, the Houthis announced that they would close the Bab el-Mandeb to Saudi shipping (but not to all international traffic). Earlier this month, a Houthi offensive routed Saudi-backed forces and gave the group control of key terrain near that chokepoint. The Houthis have since launched attacks against Riyadh’s airport and oil facilities at Yanbu, deep within Saudi territory. The kingdom is ringed with conflict — and questioning key relationships, new and old.
Oil-for-Protection Pact Wears Thin
For decades, Saudi Arabia has had an oil-for-protection pact with Washington. But that arrangement has worn thin as the US has wearied of Middle Eastern engagements: In 2019, Trump didn’t respond militarily to an attack on Saudi Aramco facilities that Washington and Riyadh blamed on Iran.
The current war has intensified the strain. In May, MBS denied the Pentagon use of Saudi bases and airspace on the grounds that Washington couldn’t protect Saudi Arabia from an Iranian response. And as the Houthis surged forward, Trump repeatedly turned down MBS’s calls for the US to intervene. Trump appears to fear that US strikes on the Houthis could cause the group to close the Bab el-Mandeb to all shipping; he has reportedly offered the Saudis intelligence support (and pushed ahead with plans to sell F-35 aircraft to Riyadh) but otherwise has told the Saudis that this is their fight.
Newer relationships haven’t been much better. Earlier this year, MBS signed the Mecca Pact, a security accord with Pakistan and Turkey. But that alliance has disappointed militarily: Pakistan has so far declined to enter the Saudi-Houthi fight in a meaningful way. That led MBS to ask China to ask Iran to ask the Houthis to tone things down — a telephone-game strategy likely to prove as ineffective as it sounds.
Saudi Arabia has been left relying on quiet cooperation with Israel and modest military support from the UK — and dealing with the fact that none of its relationships are presently adequate to guarantee its defense.
Saudi Dependency Limits Strategic Options
If Houthi attacks seriously endanger the Saudi monarchy or its oil supplies, Trump might yet feel compelled to intervene. For now, however, the situation is an embarrassment to MBS, who has sought to make Saudi Arabia a regional hegemon and global player. And it illustrates three cruel realities the kingdom cannot escape.
First, resilience has its limits. The Middle East is plagued by multiple interlocking conflicts. Investments in Hormuz workarounds are vital, but they can’t fully insulate Saudi Arabia or any other country from the effects of encompassing, violent turmoil.
Second, we’ve entered an era of diminished expectations for US power in the Middle East. For now, American policy is essentially that it is acceptable for the Houthis to blockade and bombard Saudi Arabia so long as they don’t broaden their assault on Red Sea shipping. That’s an admission of how badly the Hormuz crisis has strained US military capabilities — and a warning that America’s partners may increasingly find themselves on their own.
Third, strategic diversification is imperative but incredibly difficult. Saudi Arabia’s primary ally may be overstretched and unreliable, but there are no good near-term alternatives. The Saudis will have to hug Washington tightly for now, while hoping that the Mecca Pact or other relationships develop over time. They may also seek some temporary stability by pursuing an ugly détente with Iran.
The Saudi dilemma is sharp, but not unique. Around the world, confidence in US security guarantees is falling. Allies in Europe and East Asia are unnerved by depleted US weapons stockpiles and uncertainty about Trump’s intentions. But strategic dependencies developed over decades can’t be undone in months or even years; around Eurasia’s contested periphery, there is no backup superpower that can take America’s place. A moment in which the US remains vital, but is becoming less reliable, is one in which many allies and partners risk finding themselves adrift.