A rigorous critique of Western diplomatic engagement with Iran. The analysis details why conventional financial incentives fail against a regime that treats diplomatic negotiations as a direct extension of battlefield conflict.
Tehran’s foundational ideology views geopolitical engagement strictly through a zero-sum lens, rendering conventional western assumptions regarding economic incentives entirely obsolete. Washington consistently miscalculates the systemic motives of this clerical dictatorship, forgetting that true strategic leverage requires a permanent synthesis of military readiness and diplomatic coercion, rather than a reliance on a superficial peace deal.
Peace deal frameworks fail to realize regional realities
In “Why We Want You to Be Rich,” published in 2006, Donald Trump explained that a master negotiator knows “what the other side wants and where they’re coming from,” and is never afraid to walk away from a bad deal.”
Henry Kissinger, writing three months earlier about the clerical dictatorship in Tehran, suggested otherwise:
“A modern, strong, peaceful Iran could become a pillar of stability and progress in the region. This cannot happen unless Iran’s leaders decide whether they are representing a cause or a nation — whether their basic motivation is crusading or international cooperation.”
In truth, Iran’s rulers made that decision the moment they seized power in 1979. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini led what he called an Islamic Revolution. Never did he or his acolytes exhibit the slightest hint that Mr. Kissinger’s vision of “stability, progress, and international cooperation” held any appeal for them.
Misunderstanding the state peace deal objectives
We Americans can be slow learners. On Friday, a “senior administration official” echoed Mr. Kissinger:
“We’re also going to see whether the Iranians care more about their economic prosperity than they do their nuclear weapons program, because if they do, the President has instructed us to construct the kind of sanctions relief that would really integrate Iran into the 21st century economy, but they’re only going to get that if they make the real commitment that we need on their nuclear weapons program and on being a regional partner for peace.”
In truth, American diplomats have been talking not with “Iranians,” but with mediators for the Khomeinists who have immiserated most Iranians – tens of thousands of whom they slaughtered just this past January. Can anyone seriously believe they care about economic prosperity?
The Iranians who were murdered did want better lives and an end to the jihad against the “Great Satan” (America) and the “Little Satan” (Israel) – two nations that would love to be their friends.
Exhausting opponents blocks any real peace deal
On Sunday, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was announced. It’s to be finalized Friday in Switzerland and 60 days of further talks are to follow. That makes me nervous. Iran’s rulers never win on battlefields, but I can’t recall them ever losing in negotiations.
Last year, Abbas Araghchi, the Islamic Republic’s foreign minister, published the English-language version of his own book on deal-making: “The Power of Negotiation: Principles and Rules of Political and Diplomatic Negotiations.”
He made clear that if a diplomatic outcome is more important to Washington than to his regime, his regime will end up on top.
Among his principles: Appear patient and confident, and make the Americans seem desperate. “The Iranian negotiation style is generally known in the world as the ‘market style,’” he wrote, “which means continuous and tireless bargaining.” Over time, opponents grow weary.
Peace deal expectations misread tactical pauses
At a book launch last December, Mr. Araghchi pointed out that during the June 2025 conflict, President Trump called on Tehran to “unconditionally surrender.” Ultimately, however, the big guy in the White House agreed instead to an unconditional ceasefire – which is why the Twelve-Day War ended while there were still high-value Iranian military targets to strike.
The same thing happened this year: After 38 days of Operation Epic Fury, President Trump declared a ceasefire in exchange for a promise from Iran’s rulers to stop striking commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. That promise was immediately broken. But Mr. Trump extended the ceasefire to make room for diplomacy.
Alternating between diplomacy and force is a mistake. Skilled negotiators combine the two. Mr. Araghchi correctly explains: “War and negotiation are two sides of the same coin and that is why negotiation is sometimes described as ‘war by peaceful means.’”
Ebrahim Azizi, a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander, now head of Tehran’s foreign policy committee, confirmed this approach forthrightly to CNN a few days ago: “We have said many times that we accept a negotiation as a continuation of the battlefield.”
Subverting the battlefield via a false peace deal
Nothing I’ve said here should be mistaken for sympathy with those who claim that “Iran is stronger now” than when Joe Biden lived in the White House.
What President Trump has accomplished cannot be gainsaid. Experts estimate that prior to the Twelve-Day War, Iran’s rulers were weeks away from a nuclear weapons breakout. They were building missiles and drones by the thousands, while lavishly funding and arming their proxies, including Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Houthi rebels in Yemen.
Today, Iran’s rulers have no operating enrichment plants, most of their already enriched uranium is believed to be under tons of rubble, and more than 85% of their defense-industrial base has been destroyed.
What President Trump has achieved to date is what the Israelis call “mowing the lawn.” It’s a treatment, not a cure, but treating is preferable to the two alternatives American leaders have chosen in the past: pretending a bad deal is a good one, or ignoring a metastasizing problem in the hope it resolves itself. Both of those approaches bring “endless wars.”
President Trump would be well-advised to now do what his books on deal-making suggest: Put on the pressure. Iran’s rulers need to believe that he will resume both the naval blockade and military operations if the coming talks are unproductive.
If the regime in Tehran is weakened, not strengthened, ordinary Iranians may eventually have a chance to rid themselves of such despots as Ayatollah Mohsen Araki, a top member of Iran’s Assembly of Experts.
Last week, he told the semi-official Mehr News outlet: “America is a hostile infidel enemy, and jihad against it with all one’s strength is obligatory for every free and faithful believer who adheres to the rulings of Islam.”
By now this should be obvious: The Islamic Republic is not and does not intend to be a “partner for peace.”