Iraq’s crackdown on Kataib Hezbollah aims to weaken Iran’s strongest proxy and counter militia-empowering legislation ahead of critical elections.
Browsing: Governance
Saif al-Islam’s survival was a tactical asset in Libya’s fractured power game; his death reflects its disposable logic.
The SDF lost most territory after Arab fighters defected, forcing it into integration talks with Damascus under U.S. pressure to prevent wider conflict.
When water arrives by tanker instead of taps, scarcity becomes a daily humiliation that accelerates protest mobilization. This crisis is compounded by a “water mafia” of contractors and security-linked firms that profit from destructive infrastructure while governance fails.
The struggle reflects broader proxy competition, as Riyadh aims to block arms smuggling to the Houthis and curb Emirati influence, while Muscat fears Salafi expansion. Local tensions are managed through tribal codes but risk escalating without direct Saudi-Omani dialogue.
The YPG’s downfall resulted from overestimating foreign backing and underestimating Damascus’s resolve. The government’s strategy of offering Kurdish rights isolated the militia, revealing its lack of popular support and the conditional nature of international patronage.
Budget allocations for agriculture, water, and environment ministries remain minimal, stalling climate adaptation projects. Iraq’s regulatory framework shows some transparency but lacks accountability mechanisms and disaster‑risk planning, limiting effective implementation of its decarbonization and resilience goals amid rising climate vulnerability.
Maliki’s previous tenure saw massive corruption, sectarian conflict, and the rise of ISIS. While his allies tout his experience, critics warn his return risks renewed instability and U.S. sanctions, as Iraq’s political blocs remain deeply divided over his candidacy.
Many Iraqi politicians initially leaned toward Iran due to perceived U.S. betrayal or propaganda, but now seek integration with the West. Co‑opting these figures, rather than isolating them, could secure lasting stability and advance American interests in a post‑Iran era.
Khamenei’s succession could pave the way for a “Third Republic” led by a military strongman from the IRGC. Such a transition from clerical to authoritarian-military rule would reflect the regime’s failing legitimacy and the erosion of its founding ideology.
