A new airstrip on Zuqar Island provides surveillance and interdiction capabilities against Houthi smuggling routes. The UAE-backed National Resistance Forces use such bases to project power and intercept Iranian weapons, complicating Tehran’s support network for the Houthis.
Chinese firms dominate Iraq’s upstream sector by accepting low-profit terms, while state-backed financing secures critical infrastructure deals. Baghdad also seeks Western investment for technical expertise and to mitigate U.S. sanctions risk, maintaining a dual-track strategy to balance energy partners.
The agreement requires monthly renewals and expires in December 2025, reflecting deep political distrust. While providing short-term fiscal relief, its long-term viability is threatened by electoral politics, budget disputes, and the need for a new pipeline treaty with Turkey by 2026.
Iran relies on oil sales to China for nearly 90% of its export revenue, funding its nuclear and missile programs. The U.S. must crack down on the “Axis of Evasion,” using secondary sanctions and diplomatic pressure to cut off this financial lifeline.
Adversaries have learned they can fracture Western alliances and control strategic chokepoints by staying below retaliation thresholds. This convergence allows China to secure shipping lanes, Russia to gain naval bases, and Iran to project power through proxies like the Houthis.
Ethnic communities face disproportionate executions, poverty, and cultural repression, driving a rights-based mobilization. While not uniformly separatist, these groups increasingly demand decentralized governance and fair resource allocation, challenging the state’s Persian-centric identity and reshaping Iran’s protest landscape.
When water arrives by tanker instead of taps, scarcity becomes a daily humiliation that accelerates protest mobilization. This crisis is compounded by a “water mafia” of contractors and security-linked firms that profit from destructive infrastructure while governance fails.
If Fordow remains functional, Iran is unlikely to relinquish its nuclear ambitions, potentially leading to a breakout. If severely damaged, Tehran may negotiate under pressure. The facility’s true condition will determine if the conflict pauses or escalates anew.
Despite high volumes of hacktivism and disruptive attacks on banks and exchanges, cyber operations failed to deliver strategic military advantages. Their impact was largely psychological and temporary, underscoring their role as an enabling capability rather than a revolutionary force in modern warfare.
Al-Maliki’s candidacy reflects Iran’s need for a strong, reliable partner in Baghdad to manage its security and economic interests. Despite internal pressures, Tehran retains deep institutional influence in Iraq, demonstrating that the country’s stability remains precariously tied to external rivalries.